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Abstract 
Everyday speech is rife with errors and disfluencies, yet processing what we hear usually feels 
effortless. How does the language comprehension system accomplish such an impressive feat? 
The current experiment tests the hypothesis that listeners draw on relevant contextual and 
linguistic cues to anticipate speech errors and mentally correct them even before receiving an 
explicit correction from the speaker. In the current visual-world eyetracking experiment, we 
monitored participants’ eye movements to objects in a display while they listened to utterances 
containing reparandum-repair speech errors (e.g., …his cat, uh I mean his dog…). The contextual 
plausibility of the misspoken word, as well as the certainty with which the speaker uttered this 
word, were systematically manipulated. Results showed that listeners immediately exploited 
these cues to generate top-down expectations regarding the speaker’s communicative intention. 
Crucially, listeners used these expectations to constrain the bottom-up speech input and mentally 
correct perceived speech errors even before the speaker initiated the correction. The results 
provide powerful evidence regarding the joint process of correcting speech errors that involves 
both the speaker and the listener.  
Keywords: speech errors; repairs; prediction; eye movements 
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Imagine you and a colleague are writing an important email, and your colleague says, 
“Please hit send, uh I mean save.” Although comprehension of this utterance feels effortless, 
successful interpretation relies on the rapid and efficient coordination of mental processes that 
access and combine phonological, lexical, syntactic, and semantic information. An extra 
challenge in this case involves understanding that send was a speech error and that the listener’s 
initial interpretation to send the email should be disregarded and replaced by the speaker’s 
intended request to save the email. A central goal of psycholinguistics is to explain the 
incremental, moment-by-moment operations that give rise to spoken language comprehension, 
including those that support people’s ability to go beyond the input and recover the speaker’s 
intention. By far the most common methodological approach to achieving this goal is to use the 
so-called visual-world paradigm, pioneered by Cooper (1974) and popularized by Tanenhaus et 
al. (1995). In this paradigm, participants’ eye movements are tracked as they listen to spoken 
language while simultaneously viewing visual displays that contain relevant objects. The 
probability of fixating a particular object within a particular time window then serves as the 
dependent measure that informs us about the timescale on which linguistic interpretations are 
activated. The crucial linking hypothesis is that the bottom-up input associated with hearing the 
word activates the word’s representation in memory, which automatically triggers a saccade to 
the relevant object in the display (Allopenna et al., 1998; Tanenhaus et al., 2000). This helps 
explain the finding that listeners direct their gaze toward relevant objects within about 200 ms of 
hearing a target word, even in the absence of an explicit task. 
But successful language comprehension in the real world relies on much more than 
simply decoding linguistic input and integrating it within a broader context. Instead, speakers 
and listeners must cooperate with one another in order to optimize communication (see, e.g., 
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Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Schober & Clark, 1989). Considering speech errors from this 
perspective, speaker behaviors signaling a speech error or a correction may be treated by the 
listener as cues to begin mentally correcting the input, perhaps even before the speaker begins 
overtly repairing the utterance.  
Indeed, more recent theoretical approaches to sentence processing have increasingly 
emphasized the role of prediction in guiding comprehenders’ interpretations prior to receiving 
the input (for a review, see Kuperberg & Jaeger, 2016). One recent framework for understanding 
the role of predictive processing in language comprehension is the Noisy Channel model (Gibson 
et al., 2013), which starts with the assumption that communication involves the transmission of a 
linguistic signal across a noisy channel (“noise” here is conceptualized as any distortion of the 
input due to producer, perceiver, or environmental factors). The idea is that because noise 
regularly distorts the input, comprehenders take an active, forward-looking role during language 
processing, combining the input with relevant linguistic and contextual knowledge and mentally 
correcting perceived errors. Importantly, up to now these theoretical claims have largely been 
investigated in reading experiments. In one experiment, for example, participants who read an 
implausible sentence (The mother gave the candle the daughter) in which the insertion of a short 
function word would make it plausible (The mother gave the candle [to] the daughter) were 
likely to make this mental edit and adopt the more plausible interpretation (Gibson et al.).  
Although it certainly seems reasonable that mental corrections of this sort occur when we 
read, it is likely more common for comprehenders to encounter errors in the domain of spoken 
language, in which speakers regularly produce filled pauses such as uh and um or begin their 
utterances spontaneously without planning out the full scope of the sentence and then make 
errors and have to backtrack. Indeed, analyses of spontaneous speech reveal that speakers tend to 
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produce between six and 10 disfluencies for every 100 words (Bortfeld et al., 2001; Fox Tree, 
1995). Although the majority of these disfluencies tend to be filled pauses or repetitions, 
speakers also reliably produce errors that they then go back and repair (see, e.g., Bortfeld et al., 
Lau & Ferreira, 2005; Shriberg, 1996). Moreover, in contrast to the examples of outright ill-
formedness that have been the target of research within the Noisy Channel framework1, the study 
of disfluencies holds promise as a more ecologically valid approach to understanding how 
listeners deal with input that is noisy—“noisy” in the general sense that some of the content 
might fail to reflect the speaker’s communicative intention and therefore will need to be 
reinterpreted and reconstructed by the listener. 
Investigations of disfluency demonstrate that listeners do not process disfluencies 
passively, but instead use them as information to help reconstruct the speaker’s communicative 
intention. For example, listeners attempt to assess the causes of speaker’s filled pauses, treating 
them as evidence the speaker is about to refer to a new entity in the discourse (Arnold et al., 
2004, 2007), and as a cue to speaker truthfulness and reliability (Loy et al., 2017). The Noisy 
Channel framework suggests that listeners will also take an active role in the process of error 
correction, zeroing in on cues that signal a likely speech error and attempting to uncover the 
speaker’s intended meaning. At the same time, speakers also monitor their output for coherence 
and will often explicitly signal that an error has occurred. From this perspective, the listener and 
speaker work together to optimize communication, with the speaker explicitly repairing speech 
errors and the listener exploiting any cues that suggest a speech error has occurred and mentally 
correcting it, perhaps even before the speaker initiates the correction.  
                                                 
1 A notable exception is the field of computational linguistics, which has successfully applied this framework to the 
processing of spoken language (see, e.g., Honal & Schultz, 2003; Johnson & Charniak, 2004; Zwarts et al., 2010). 
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To make this more concrete, consider another example utterance: Bill likes to throw the 
Frisbee in the park with his uhh cat, uh I mean his dog… The speaker here notices he has made 
an error and initiates the process of explicitly replacing the reparandum (cat) with the repair 
(dog). However, if the listener is actively modeling the speaker’s communicative intentions, she 
may mark cat as a potential error and mentally repair it with the more plausible dog. This 
example contains two potentially relevant cues to the listener. First, listeners may rely on their 
real-world knowledge that people typically play in the park with dogs rather than cats to rapidly 
judge cat as implausible, anticipate that this is an error, and correct it with the more plausible 
dog. It is well known that semantic information about the utterance is used to predict upcoming 
words (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999). In contrast, the crucial question we ask here is whether 
the listener’s higher-level model of what the speaker is trying to communicate can constrain and 
potentially override the bottom-up input when that input is perceived as a speech error. Second, 
the presence of the filled pause (uhh) immediately before cat may serve as an additional cue to 
the listener. Specifically, we predicted that listeners would interpret this signal as evidence that 
the speaker was having trouble producing the intended word, which may then make listeners 
more likely to mark it as a potential error, regardless of the semantic context. This prediction 
follows from previous findings demonstrating that speakers tend to use filled pauses when 
uncertain about an upcoming word (Brennan & Williams, 1995; Smith & Clark, 1993). Further, 
Fraundorf and Watson (2011) have proposed that filled pauses are effective attention-orienting 
devices, based on their evidence that memory for complex discourses tends to be enhanced when 
the discourse contains fillers. In fact, Fraundorf and Watson suggested that one reason for this 
effect might be that the presence of filled pauses leads listeners to infer that the speaker is not 
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confident in the utterance, which may then prompt the listener to devote extra effort to 
comprehension.  
Although we predicted that the filled pause would lead the listener to be less confident in 
the speaker’s utterance, regardless of the semantic context, other hypotheses are also possible. 
For example, Corley et al. (2007) provided evidence using event-related potentials that the 
presence of a filled pause may lead listeners to reduce the extent to which they use real-world 
knowledge to predict an upcoming word. On this account, one might predict an interaction 
between the plausibility of the reparandum and the presence of the filled pause, such that 
listeners might be more likely to predict an unexpected utterance when the speaker becomes 
disfluent. 
At a broader theoretical level, these ideas align with the Good-Enough language-
processing framework (Ferreira et al., 2002; Ferreira & Lowder, 2016). According to this 
approach, comprehension mechanisms will sometimes fail to deliver a faithful interpretation of a 
sentence if such an interpretation would violate the comprehender’s syntactic or semantic 
expectations. Up to now, most work conducted within this framework has emphasized distortions 
and normalizations that are potentially problematic, including misinterpretations based on 
syntactic errors (Christianson et al., 2001; Ferreira, 2003), and shallow interpretations that fail to 
distinguish between closely related but distinct concepts (Barton & Sanford, 1993). As Ferreira 
(2003) argued, distortions clearly have the potential to undermine effective communication, but 
these normalizations may sometimes be helpful given that speakers make errors and often either 
fail to correct them, or correct them only after some delay. It therefore might sometimes be 
adaptive for the comprehension system to normalize input that is unexpected. 
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In the current experiment, we investigated the extent to which listeners are sensitive to 
cues of plausibility and speaker certainty during online sentence processing, and whether they 
can use these cues to rapidly anticipate and mentally correct errors. Participants listened to 
sentences containing reparandum-repair disfluencies (…cat uh I mean dog…) in which we 
systematically manipulated the plausibility of the reparandum and whether or not it was preceded 
by a filled pause. Listeners heard these sentences while viewing four-image displays that 
included images corresponding to the reparandum, the repair, and two distractor images. By 
analyzing fixation patterns to the two critical images across the time course of the utterance, we 
can examine how changes in the plausibility of the reparandum and the speaker’s relative 
certainty about the utterance influence listeners’ commitment to the reparandum versus the repair 
and how these commitments change as the utterance unfolds in real time. Importantly, this 
approach allows us to directly compare listeners’ relative weighting of the bottom-up input that 
comes from the speech signal versus their top-down expectations regarding the communicative 
intentions of the speaker, by examining how these sources of information affect where listeners 
direct their fixations. If listeners rapidly exploit cues about plausibility and speaker certainty to 
create a strong prediction about what the speaker intends to communicate, then we should 
observe that listeners show a decreased tendency to fixate the reparandum picture (e.g., cat) 
when it is implausible in the context, or is uttered with uncertainty, or both, and instead show an 
increased tendency to fixate the repair (e.g., dog) even before the speaker starts to articulate an 
explicit correction. This pattern would provide evidence that listeners use their top-down 
expectations to constrain the bottom-up speech input and mentally correct the perceived speech 
error even before receiving any overt signal from the speaker that an error has occurred.  
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Method 
Participants  
Thirty-two students at the University of California, Davis participated in this experiment 
in exchange for course credit. They were all native English speakers and reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. All participants provided informed consent, and all procedures were 
approved by the Institutional Review Board at UC Davis. 
Materials  
Forty sets of experimental materials were created, as in Example (1). Each sentence 
contained an introductory preamble, a reparandum (e.g., cat), an edit interval (uh I mean), a 
repair (e.g., dog), and then a continuation of the sentence. The reparandum-repair pairs were 
strong semantic associates of one another (e.g., cat-dog, salt-pepper, cake-pie) and thus seemed 
that they might reasonably elicit semantic substitution errors from a speaker. Plausibility was 
manipulated with respect to the fit of the reparandum with the preceding sentence context: in the 
Plausible condition, the reparandum fit naturally with what preceded it, whereas in the 
Implausible condition, the reparandum constituted a semantically odd continuation of the 
sentence. In contrast, the repair fit plausibly in all contexts. A filled pause immediately preceded 
the reparandum in the Uncertain condition, but not in the Certain condition. Each set of 
experimental items was associated with a visual display that consisted of four color images (see 
Figure 1) representing two critical entities—the reparandum (e.g., a cat) and the repair (e.g., a 
dog)—as well as two unrelated distractors (e.g., a plant and a dishtowel)2. The images used in 
                                                 
2 Semantic similarity between the reparandum and repair was assessed using latent semantic analysis (Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997). Mean semantic similarity between reparandum-repair pairs (e.g., cat-dog) was 0.45. Similarity 
between reparandum-repair pairs was significantly higher than semantic similarity between reparanda and the 
unrelated distractors (0.13), t = 9.25, p < .001, as well as semantic similarity between repairs and the unrelated 
distractors (0.16), t = 8.19, p < .001. 
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the experiment came from a combination of images we had collected and used in previous 
visual-world experiments, as well as Google image searches. The two distractor images for each 
trial were chosen mostly randomly. In some cases, one or both of the distractor images were 
consistent with contextual elements of the sentence, but the distractor images were never 
mentioned in any of the utterances, nor were they meant to be predicted based on the utterance. 
For example, one item introduced the context of a wedding with the critical utterance being 
“…the groom, uh I mean the bride…” In addition to the reparandum and repair pictures for this 
trial (i.e., a groom and a bride), one of the distractor images was a church, whereas the other was 
a chair. Despite the thematic similarity of some distractor images to the context of the utterance, 
participants very rarely fixated the distractor images during the critical portion of the utterance, 
as we will report in the Results section. 
1a. Every Saturday, Bill likes to grab a book and sit on the couch with his cat, uh I mean his dog, 
 where they spend the afternoon. (Plausible-Certain) 
1b. Every Saturday, Bill likes to grab a Frisbee and go to the park with his cat, uh I mean his 
 dog, where they spend the afternoon. (Implausible-Certain) 
1c. Every Saturday, Bill likes to grab a book and sit on the couch with his uhh cat, uh I mean his 
 dog, where they spend the afternoon. (Plausible-Uncertain) 
1d. Every Saturday, Bill likes to grab a Frisbee and go to the park with his uhh cat, uh I mean 
 his dog, where they spend the afternoon. (Implausible-Uncertain) 
 
To ensure the validity of our plausibility manipulation, we presented written versions of 
the Plausible-Certain and Implausible-Certain conditions up to and including the reparandum to 
24 participants drawn from the same population, none of whom participated in the eyetracking 
portion of this study. Items were counterbalanced across two lists and randomized. Participants 
judged how likely they believed the events described by the sentence were on a scale from 1 
(highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely). The Plausible condition (5.80) was rated as significantly 
more plausible than the Implausible condition (2.80), t(39) = 15.71, p < .001. 
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The materials also included a set of 54 filler items representing a variety of different 
sentence types, each with a corresponding visual array of four images. None of the filler 
sentences contained speech errors or disfluencies. All sentences were recorded by a female 
native speaker of American English who was naïve to the purposes of the recordings. Sentences 
were recorded separately for each condition so as to make them sound as natural as possible. We 
analyzed the maximum fundamental frequency (F0 max) of the reparandum across conditions 
and found that F0 max was significantly higher in the Uncertain condition (304 Hz) than the 
Certain condition (236 Hz), F(1,39) = 27.73, p < .001. This is consistent with the idea that the 
speaker was communicating uncertainty about the word that was articulated immediately after 
the filled paused and tended to produce it with a higher pitch (e.g., uhh cat) (see, e.g., Brennan & 
Williams, 1995; Smith & Clark, 1993). Thus, it is not only the presence or absence of the filled 
pause that signaled uncertainty to the listener, but also the prosodic features of the reparandum. 
Crucially, however, there was no effect of Plausibility on F0 max, nor was there an interaction 
between Plausibility and Certainty (Fs < 2.1, ps > .15). Further, there were no systematic 
differences in the timing of the critical windows across any conditions (described in detail 
below). 
The items were counterbalanced across four lists. Written versions of all experimental 
and filler sentences, along with their accompanying images, are available as supplemental online 
material. 
Procedure  
Eye movements were recorded with an EyeLink 1000 Plus system (SR Research) at a 
sampling rate of 1,000 Hz. The tracker was calibrated at the beginning of each session and 
throughout the session as needed. Participants were told they would view images on the screen 
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while also listening to sentences. They were explicitly told, “Some of the sentences might 
contain errors,” but were instructed to try to understand each sentence; there was no explicit task 
other than to listen to the sentences for meaning. At the start of each trial, a fixation point was 
presented in the center of the screen. When gaze was steady on this point, the experimenter 
pressed a button that presented the visual display. After a 3,000 ms delay, the corresponding 
sentence was presented via headphones. After the sentence finished playing, the images 
disappeared and the fixation point for the next trial appeared. 
Participants were first presented with four of the filler sentences. After this warm-up 
block, the remaining sentences were presented pseudorandomly under the constraint that no 
more than two trials from the same condition could be presented consecutively. The locations of 
the four images within a visual display were randomized on each trial.  
Analysis  
Statistical analyses were performed using the lme4 package in R. The dependent variable 
was the proportion of fixations per participant per trial to the pictures of interest3. We fit linear 
mixed-effects regression models that included Plausibility, Certainty, and their interaction as 
fixed effects as well as subjects and items as crossed random effects. Fixed effects were sum-
coded. The random-effects structure included the maximally appropriate random intercepts as 
well as by-subject and by-item random slopes for the factors Plausibility, Certainty, and their 
interaction. In cases where the maximal model failed to converge, the random-effects structure 
was sequentially simplified. All p-values were obtained using the lmerTest package in R 
(Kuznetsova et al., 2016). 
                                                 
3 Analyses were conducted on proportion of fixations so as to align more closely with the fixation plots. Logistic 
regression analyses using the probability of a fixation within a given time window produced an identical pattern of 
results.  
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Within each sound file, we marked the onsets of three critical words: the reparandum, the 
onset of the edit interval (i.e., uh I mean), and the repair. Four windows were constructed around 
these onsets. Window 1 encompassed the 1,000 ms before the onset of the reparandum. Window 
2 measured from the onset of the reparandum to the onset of the edit interval4. Window 3 
measured from the onset of the edit interval to the onset of the repair. Window 4 measured from 
the onset of the repair until 800 ms had elapsed. There were no main effects or interactions of 
Plausibility and Certainty on the duration of these windows across experimental items (Fs < 2.6, 
ps > .11). All windows were shifted forward 200 ms to account for the time required to launch a 
signal-based saccade.  
                                                 
4 The mean duration of Window 2 was 1,075 ms; however, the mean duration of the spoken reparandum was 510 
ms. Thus, the speaker tended to utter the reparandum, insert a pause (mean duration of 565 ms), and then initiate the 
repair.  
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Figure 1 
Example visual display for a trial. The locations of the four images were randomized on each 
trial. 
 
  
15 
 
Results 
 Fixation plots are presented in Figure 2, and results of the statistical analyses are 
presented in Table 1. In addition, Figure 3 presents mean proportion of fixations to the two 
critical pictures (i.e., the reparandum and repair pictures) in each of the four time windows. 
Visual inspection of Window 1 suggests that in the Plausible condition, listeners tended to 
consider the two critical pictures as equally likely continuations of the sentence, whereas in the 
Implausible condition, listeners showed a strong tendency to consider the picture corresponding 
to the repair. Consistent with this observation, statistical analyses of fixation proportions during 
this time window revealed significant main effects of Plausibility in looks to both pictures: 
listeners were more likely to consider the reparandum picture in the Plausible condition versus 
the Implausible condition, whereas they were more likely to consider the repair picture in the 
Implausible condition versus the Plausible condition. In addition, there was a significant main 
effect of Certainty in looks to the reparandum picture with listeners being more likely to look at 
the reparandum in the Uncertain condition versus the Certain condition. Although inspection of 
Figure 2 suggests that this main effect of Certainty may have been driven by the Implausible-
Uncertain condition, the test of the interaction was nowhere close to being significant (t = 0.64). 
This is consistent with the idea that the listener interpreted the filled pause in the Uncertain 
condition as a signal that the speaker was not entirely sure what she would say next, and so the 
listener tended to fixate multiple candidate objects, inflating fixation proportions on the cat. 
 Within Window 2, there were robust effects of Plausibility and Certainty in looks to both 
the reparandum and repair pictures. Listeners were more likely to consider the reparandum 
picture and less likely to consider the repair picture in the Plausible condition versus the 
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Implausible condition. Listeners were also more likely to consider the reparandum picture and 
less likely to consider the repair picture in the Certain condition versus the Uncertain condition.  
 Within Window 3, there was again a significant effect of Certainty in looks to both the 
reparandum and repair pictures, with listeners being more likely to consider the reparandum and 
less likely to consider the repair in the Certain condition versus the Uncertain condition. No 
significant effects emerged in Window 4. 
The transition from Window 1 to Window 2 (i.e., before and then after the onset of the 
reparandum) represents a key test of our hypothesis that listeners would use the presence of a 
filled pause to put less weight on the speaker’s utterance and perform a mental correction of the 
input. That is, whereas the plausibility manipulation occurred early in the utterance, affecting 
fixation patterns even before Window 1, the certainty manipulation (i.e., presence versus absence 
of a filled pause) occurred toward the end of Window 1. Thus, one might predict that upon 
hearing the onset of the reparandum in Window 2, listeners should show a reduced tendency to 
look at the reparandum picture in this window in the Uncertain condition versus the Certain 
condition.  
This hypothesis was tested by constructing linear mixed-effects regression models as 
described above, but including Window as a fixed effect (i.e., Window 1 versus Window 2), 
along with the fixed effects of Plausibility, Certainty, and their interactions. Regarding 
proportion of looks to the reparandum picture, there was a significant Certainty-by-Window 
interaction (estimate = 0.03, SE = 0.01, t = 4.04, p < .001) such that there was a smaller increase 
in looks to the reparandum from Window 1 to Window 2 when the reparandum was preceded by 
a filled pause compared to when it was spoken with certainty (see Figure 3). A similar Certainty-
by-Window interaction was observed in proportion of looks to the repair picture (estimate = -
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0.02, SE = 0.01, t = -2.72, p < .01) such that listeners in the Uncertain condition tended to stay on 
the repair picture from Window 1 to Window 2 (despite hearing the speaker utter the 
reparandum), whereas listeners in the Certain condition showed a large decrease in looks to the 
repair picture. For these analyses, no other two-way or three-way interactions were significant (ts 
< 1.5, ps > .14).  
This pattern from Window 1 to Window 2 supports the idea that listeners used the filled 
pause to update their mental representation of what the speaker was trying to communicate, 
thereby placing less weight on the bottom-up input and more weight on the top-down prediction 
of what the speaker had likely intended to say. Further, proportions of fixations to the distractor 
images during Window 2 were very low (i.e., mean of 0.06, which did not vary by condition), 
suggesting that listeners very rarely made a mental correction from the reparandum to one of the 
other entities. These results suggest that listeners make their mental corrections strategically, 
drawing on cues such as plausibility and speaker certainty to derive a confident internal 
representation of what the speaker intended to communicate, which can override the actual 
bottom-up input when what is said conflicts with the listener’s prediction. 
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Table 1 
Results of Mixed Effects Analyses 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                              Reparandum                                         Repair 
Model parameters               Estimate (95% CI)    SE        t        p           Estimate (95% CI)   SE        t            p 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Window 1 
     Intercept     .26 (.23, .30)  .02  14.42    <.001  .39 (.35, .43)  .02  17.16  <.001 
     Plausibility     -.06 (-.09, -.03)  .01  -4.35    <.001  .07 (.04, .11)  .02  4.22   <.001  
     Certainty     .03 (.01, .05)  .01  2.61    .013  .01 (-.02, .03)  .01  .57   >.250 
     Plausibility*Certainty  .01 (-.01, .03)  .01  .64    >.250  -.00 (-.03, .02)  .01  -.44   >.250  
Window 2 
     Intercept     .43 (.38, .47)  .02  18.14   <.001  .35 (.31, .39)  .02  15.38    <.001  
     Plausibility     -.04 (-.07, -.01)  .01  -2.89   .006  .05 (.02, .08)  .01  3.70    <.001   
     Certainty     -.04 (-.06, -.02)  .01  -3.16    .004  .05 (.02, .08)  .01  3.34    .002                 
     Plausibility*Certainty  .00 (-.02, .02)  .00  .00    >.250  -.00 (-.03, .02)  .01  -.40    >.250   
Window 3 
     Intercept     .25 (.22, .29)  .02  12.93    <.001  .53 (.47, .59)  .03  17.26    <.001  
     Plausibility     -.02 (-.05, .00)  .01  -1.63    .112  .01 (-.02, .04)  .01  .83    >.250 
     Certainty     -.05 (-.08, -.02)  .02  -3.04    .004  .06 (.02, .09)  .02  3.38    .002 
     Plausibility*Certainty   .01 (-.01, .03)  .01  1.15    >.250  -.01 (-.03, .02)  .01  -.42    >.250 
Window 4 
     Intercept     .12 (.09, .15)  .01  7.81    <.001  .64 (.57, .71)  .03  18.37    <.001 
     Plausibility     -.01 (-.02, .01)  .01  -.70    >.250  -.00 (-.02, .02)  .01  -.02    >.250 
     Certainty     -.01 (-.03, .01)  .01  -.82    >.250  .00 (-.02, .03)  .01  .23    >.250 
     Plausibility*Certainty  .01 (-.00, .02)  .01  1.44    .149  .01 (-.02, .03)  .01  .49    >.250 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  CI = confidence interval; SE = standard error 
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Figure 2 
Proportion of fixations to each picture type across the four conditions. All fixation plots were anchored to the onset of the reparandum 
(vertical line at time zero). The second vertical line represents the mean onset of the edit interval (i.e.,”uh I mean”). The third vertical 
line represents the mean onset of the repair. These lines represent the real-time onsets of these words, whereas all time windows were 
shifted forward 200 ms for the statistical analyses to account for the time required to launch a signal-based saccade. Error bands 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
20 
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Figure 3 
Mean proportion of fixations to the reparandum picture (top row) and repair picture (bottom row) as a function of certainty and 
reparandum plausibility, for each of the four time windows. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Discussion 
How does language comprehension proceed so rapidly even when the speech signal is 
rife with errors and disfluencies? The work presented here suggests that one way we accomplish 
this feat is by anticipating and correcting speech errors even before receiving an overt correction 
from the speaker. The experiment demonstrated that listeners draw on top-down cues of 
contextual plausibility and speaker certainty to constrain their interpretations of the bottom-up 
input. Before the speaker uttered the reparandum, there was a robust effect of plausibility that 
guided listeners’ expectations about what the speaker would say: listeners considered the cat and 
dog equally when either would form a natural continuation of the sentence, but there was a 
strong preference to consider the dog over the cat when the dog was the only item that fit the 
context. When the speaker uttered the reparandum (e.g., cat), listeners’ degree of commitment to 
the cat versus the dog depended largely on how plausibly cat fit the preceding context, as well as 
the certainty with which the speaker produced the utterance. That is, if cat was implausible or 
was preceded by a filled pause, listeners were more likely to switch to the dog. The combined 
effect of an implausible reparandum that was uttered with uncertainty (see Implausible-Uncertain 
condition in Figure 2) led listeners to commit to the repair early and to some extent discount the 
reparandum. When the speaker initiated the correction, all conditions showed a shift from the 
reparandum to the repair, but the effect of certainty persisted. The results provide powerful 
evidence regarding the joint process of correcting speech errors that involves both the speaker 
and the listener. That is, listeners do not wait passively for speakers to explicitly correct their 
errors. Instead, listeners actively model the communicative intentions of speakers, rapidly 
integrating relevant cues to anticipate and mentally correct perceived errors.  
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The fixation patterns in Window 2 (i.e., at the onset of the reparandum) are particularly 
relevant, as this was the point in the utterance when the speaker made the error but before she 
initiated the explicit correction. Even though the speaker had not yet initiated the repair, listeners 
were less likely to fixate the reparandum if it was implausible or if the speaker signaled some 
degree of uncertainty, and instead, listeners were more likely to direct their fixations toward the 
repair. The additive nature of these effects shows that our manipulation of speaker certainty led 
listeners to put less confidence in the speaker’s utterance regardless of its plausibility. These 
results are important because the extant literature concerning how listeners might use the filled 
pause to inform their predictions suggests that filled pauses primarily signal an unexpected 
upcoming word or expression (see Corley et al., 2007). Our results show that a filled pause also 
leads listeners to place less confidence in the speaker’s utterance, regardless of the context, 
which is an important contribution to the literature on how speaker disfluencies inform the 
inferences listeners may draw concerning the upcoming input and the speaker. It should be 
noted, however, that our experiment was designed so that the filled pause always preceded an 
upcoming speech error and never signaled that an unexpected word or phrase might follow it. 
Thus, an important goal of future work will be to more carefully explore the factors that signal to 
listeners when a filled pause communicates that the speaker is about to say something 
unexpected as opposed to when the speaker does not have a high degree of confidence in the 
utterance, and how these expectations might interact.  
The notion that the filled pause signaled uncertainty to listeners in the current experiment 
is consistent with previous work by Arnold et al. (2004, 2007) demonstrating that listeners can 
use a filled pause to inform their predictions about what the speaker will say next. For example, 
Arnold et al. (2004) showed that when participants heard an instruction to move one object and 
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then another instruction that contained a filled pause (e.g., Put the grapes above the candle. Now 
put thee uh…), they rapidly predicted that the speaker would refer to something new to the 
discourse (as shown by eye-movement patterns). This previous work and the current experiment 
are similar in that they demonstrate listeners’ sensitivity to filled pauses as an informative cue 
signaling that the speaker is having a problem with language production, which prompts listeners 
to actively anticipate what might come next. The current experiment goes beyond these previous 
findings in demonstrating that listeners can use these cues to generate a confident top-down 
prediction of what the speaker is trying to communicate, which can override the bottom-up input 
when it does not match the listener’s prediction.   
Overall, the results are consistent with the predictions of Noisy Channel models of 
language comprehension but expand this approach in important ways. According to this 
framework, the noise inherent in everyday language necessitates a comprehension system in 
which the perceived input is weighed against assumptions about the communicative intent. The 
current results are consistent with this framework in demonstrating that the linguistic context in 
which the error is encountered, as well as the speaker’s certainty about the utterance, are two 
crucial sources of information that listeners exploit to detect errors. Our work also highlights the 
importance of studying the error correction mechanisms that are inherent to the Noisy Channel 
model in contexts beyond the written domain. As we have noted, the cooperative nature of 
spoken language comprehension makes this a particularly fruitful area in which to investigate the 
comprehender’s relative weighting of bottom-up linguistic input versus top-down expectations 
about the overarching message, as speakers and listeners work together to optimize 
communication. Indeed, our work demonstrates that listeners can mentally repair speech errors 
even before the speaker has time to explicitly initiate a correction.  
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In addition, we have recently argued (Ferreira & Lowder, 2016; Lowder & Ferreira, 
2016a, 2016b) that the process of mentally correcting speech errors may be akin to the process of 
generating sets of contrastive alternates in semantic focus constructions. Speakers often use 
focus constructions to contrast one entity with another, as illustrated in The woman went to the 
animal store and brought home not a dog but rather a… Our work provides support for the 
hypothesis that the focused item in a focus construction and the reparandum in a disfluent 
utterance (e.g., …a dog, uh I mean a…) both function to activate a set of related concepts or 
semantic features that then allow the listener to anticipate the rest of the sentence. This view is 
consistent with formal approaches to dialogue that treat disfluencies as one of many clarification 
devices available to interlocutors (Ginzburg et al., 2014) to facilitate mutual understanding, as 
well as an effective method of orienting the listener’s attention (Fraundorf & Watson, 2011). A 
key area of future study thus involves uncovering the similarities and differences between the 
predictive mechanisms that underlie the processing of speech errors and the processing of focus 
more generally. Further, a major goal for future investigation will be generalizing these claims 
using experimental approaches beyond the visual-world paradigm, given the inherent limitations 
associated with this paradigm (e.g., presenting participants with a limited array of images). 
Regarding models of language processing, this work extends the Good-Enough 
framework in a new direction. Although this approach has been very influential in the sentence-
processing literature, it has tended to focus exclusively on the ways in which comprehenders 
misinterpret linguistic input such that they often derive interpretations that are underspecified, 
incomplete, or inaccurate. In contrast, the current work shows that there are also cases in which 
normalizing the input can be quite adaptive to the comprehension system, serving to make 
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communication between speaker and listener more efficient by allowing the comprehender to 
understand the message the speaker intended to convey. 
This finding of adaptive normalization has important broader implications. The current 
work shows that the listener’s internal model of the speaker’s production system strongly 
constrains how the input is weighted. That is, if the listener is able to derive a confident top-
down representation of the speaker’s intended message, the bottom-up signal will be adjusted in 
favor of the representation derived from the listener’s expectations. If listeners’ ability to 
normalize linguistic input is based on their model of speakers’ communicative behavior and 
intentions, then we would predict that the more a listener knows about a speaker, the more 
successful the normalization will be, opening up a line of research into the links between strength 
of social relationship and communicative success (see Grodner & Sedivy, 2007, for evidence that 
speaker reliability can affect the inferences listeners draw during language comprehension). 
Additionally, speaker modeling might rely on mechanisms linked to theory of mind (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2014), which are known to undergo significant change during childhood (e.g., Liu et al., 
2009). From this perspective, adaptive normalization during language comprehension likely 
improves during early development. A deeper understanding of how adaptive normalization 
during language comprehension takes place will require a research approach that brings together 
cognitive, social, and developmental perspectives, among others. 
This work thus adds to the growing evidence that successful language processing requires 
interlocutors to model each other’s communicative intentions and not merely to derive an 
accurate representation of the input. Prior work has already established that filled pauses help 
listeners better understand the speaker’s message (Arnold et al., 2004, 2007) and may also help 
listeners detect a speaker’s attempt at deception (Loy et al., 2017). The current results build on 
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this knowledge by showing that listeners do not always take even the lexical input of the speaker 
at face value, but instead take advantage of cues that allow them to assess the speaker’s intention. 
Our results highlight the independent contribution of two of these cues, such that when a speaker 
signals uncertainty and then says something implausible, the listener has sufficient evidence 
justifying the assumption that the speaker did not say what she meant. In scenarios such as this, 
the listener will derive a model of what the speaker intended to say and will mentally repair the 
utterance, even before the repair is initiated by the speaker.  
Context of the Research 
 Recent work in the areas of sentence processing in particular and cognitive science more 
generally has focused heavily on the extent to which humans anticipate and actively predict 
upcoming information. The current line of work was inspired by our hypothesis that listeners 
might rely on relevant cues from the speaker and use these cues to generate top-down predictions 
about what the speaker intended to say that can override an error in the bottom-up speech input. 
The current results offer robust support in favor of this hypothesis and suggest that the approach 
used here might be especially useful in future studies examining predictive processing. These 
fields have also recently started to emphasize the need to understand cognitive processes more 
naturalistically, taking into consideration the normal contexts in which language comprehension 
takes place and the normal variation in the form and quality of the linguistic signal (for recent 
discussion, see Hasson et al., 2018). These results help us understand why listeners don’t simply 
give up when they encounter “noisy” utterances that deviate significantly from the idealized 
stimuli typically presented in psycholinguistic experiments: Listeners comprehend such 
utterances because the language system includes mechanisms for identifying words that seem 
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inconsistent with the speaker’s communicative intention and replacing them with words that 
better reflect what the speaker likely meant to say. 
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